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T MIDNIGHT ON 2 OCTOBER 1990 the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) ceased to exist. The following day the armed forces of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr, took control of the personnel, equip­
ment, and installations of what had been the National People's Army (Nationale 
Volksarmee or NVA). By any reckoning this was a massive undertaking and 
one of great historical significance. It was massive because of the sheer amount 
of equipment, ammunition, and acreage for which the Bundeswehr found itself 
responsible in the new federal states, and it was historic because soldiers who 
had faced each other across a deep ideological divide for over thirty years would 
now be serving together. 
The six active divisions of the NV A, along with State Security and border 
forces, had been stationed in some 3,300 installations, and the GDR's military 
materiel legacy included 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500 
artillery pieces, 100,000 wheeled vehicles, and 300,000 tons of ammunition. 1 
Securing, inventorying, and disposing of this materiel was to be a major mission 
for the Bundeswehr throughout its first years in the new states. Complicating 
this mission was the almost immediate need to support the liberation of Kuwait 
through materiel shipments and support of departing U.S.; units, the additional 
responsibility to assist the Western Group of Soviet Forces in an orderly 
withdrawal from German territory; and the longer-term requirement to reduce 
the Bundeswehr's size by almost 30 percent. 
Of more lasting significance, however, will be the human impact of the union 
of the two Germanys. It is difficult to predict how this will play itself out, as 
these two societies seek to become one. The people of the new states have gone 
through a roller coaster of emotions since refugees from the GDR first began 
seeking asylum in West German embassies in East Berlin, Budapest, and 
Prague in July of 1989, beginning the process that would lead to the "Turning 
Point" (die Wende) in German history. Since then the East Germans have 
experienced the fear and exultation of those October and November days when 
they chanted "We are the people" in Leipzig, Berlin, and elsewhere, as well as 
the euphoria of unification, and they continue to experience the uncertainty of 
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their economic future and a sense of second-class citizenship. If the changes 
for West Germans have not been as dramatic, the effects have certainly been 
felt intensely. 
In the midst of the changes wrought by unification, the Bundeswehr took 
on missions for which its origin and history had uniquely qualified it. First, there 
was the self-imposed requirement to select former NV A officers and noncom­
missioned officers who requested active duty in the Bundeswehr and then train 
them to assume the functions of leaders in the armed forces of a democratic 
society. Second, the Bundeswehr would have to build legitimacy for the armed 
forces among an East German population that had learned to distrust the 
military. The concepts of Innere Fuehrung, or "Inner Leadership," which had 
stood the Bundeswehr in good stead in similar endeavors at its beginning and 
throughout its short history, were used again to meet these new challenges. 
This paper describes some of the ways these concepts aided in facilitating 
the dual processes of the integration of former NV A officers and noncommis­
sioned officers into the Bundeswehr and the acceptance of the military in the 
new German states. It begins with a brief analysis of the concepts and their 
perceived strengths and weaknesses. It describes the essential differences 
between the Bundeswehr and the NV A leadership philosophy, political educa­
tion, and outlook and also the impact the revolutionary political changes of the 
Turning Point and the consequent reunification had on both of these armies. 
After a brief discussion of the legacy of the NV A, this study describes how the 
concepts of Innere Fuehrung were applied to combat that legacy, the challenges 
faced in this endeavor, and prospects for the future. 
The thesis of this paper is that, despite their flaws and shortcomings, the 
principles of Innere Fuehrung played a key role in the early development of 
the Bundeswehr as an army in a democracy and in its acceptance by the civilian 
populace of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that these principles have 
promoted the same processes in the new Gennan states. Although the NV A was 
not the anny the Bundeswehr thought it was facing during the years of the Cold 
War, its true legacy is being sunnounted by leaders well-versed in Innere 
Fuehrung. Grave problems remain, however. A sensitive application of the 
concepts of Innere Fuehrung can help solve some of these problems, and, in 
fact, some of them mirror issues from the Bundeswehr's own history, while 
others, such as the economic conditions in the new states that adversely affect 
soldiers and civilians alike, are not amenable to correction by the military alone 
and therefore have the potential to undo the successes of the early pioneers to 
the East. The Bundeswehr can certainly lay claim to one of the few success 

















IKE OTHER GERMAN WORDS that describe a whole complex of 
philosophical ideas, Innere Fuehrung has no adequate, concise English 
translation. Donald Abenheim, in what has become the standard work on the 
history of the development of the concept in both German and English, 
describes it as " ... military leadership appropriate to the modem world, which 
enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen 
... [It is the] attempt to reconcile the citizen with the soldier, and to overcome 
the traditional antagonism between democracy and the military in German 
history ... 2 
The need for such a concept became evident when, following the 
demilitarization of West German society after World War II, the leadership of 
the fledgling Federal Republic of Germany came under pressure to provide 
armed forces for the common defense of western Europe. The Allies had 
decided at Potsdam in August of 1945 that "the German educational system 
must be supervised so that Nazi and militaristic precepts are eliminated com­
pletely . . . ... 3 The aims of the occupation forces matched the natural inclination 
of the German population so well that in 1954 Paul Sethe could write in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 
The military tradition of the Gennans was broken off in 1945. In the nine years 
since, memories and sentiments have become overwhelming among young 
people that make it difficult to link up with this heritage. Two lost wars [caused] 
their terrible casualties; great parts of our cities will remain in rubble for long to 
come; the appeal to idealism and a sense of sacrifice have been brutally abused 
and arouse today only bitterness among many; the long struggle of the occupiers 
against Gennan soldierly pride has not been without effect; the division of 
Gennany paralyzes many.4 
The challenges that faced the founders of the federal armed forces were to 
overcome this distrust of all things military, which was a legacy of the military's 
misuse by the National Socialist regime, and to provide a raison d'etre for 
military forces in a democracy that would confer legitimacy on them in a 
modem pluralistic society. At the same time, they recognized that new concepts 
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of professionalism and leadership were needed within the military in order to 
protect the state and the individual soldier from the excesses of a reactionary 
military elite. In short, they were faced with the problem of the proper ordering 
of the military within their democratic society. 
This was not and is not today a peripheral question. As Samuel Huntington 
has noted: "The ordering of its civil-military relations . . .  is basic to a nation's 
military security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level 
is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military 
security at the least sacrifice of other social values ... 5 In other Western 
democracies the development of these relations, the growth of a military 
tradition supporting democratic social values, and the evolution of an officer 
corps that embodies ideals necessary to sustain these values in a military 
environment have generally taken place over an extended and unbroken nation­
al history. Even when controversy arises, it does so within the context of a 
general understanding of the utility of the armed forces and their proper place 
in society. 
In the 1950s the founders of the Bundeswehr faced the problems of defining 
these relations without benefit of history; of discovering a tradition that would 
encourage their proper development; and of providing leaders, most of whom 
would come at first from a military with anti-democratic roots, with the tools 
and the will to support the social values necessary for the proper functioning of 
a military within a democracy. They would have to do all of this in the glare of 
publicity and through dialogue with a public which, for the most part, had no 
desire to face the questions it was being asked. 
As early as 1948, upon drawing the necessary conclusions from the Berlin 
blockade, the United States began to consider with seriousness the need for 
German rearmament. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized the 
need for a common Western defense and understood as well that armed forces 
were part of a nation's claim to sovereignty. The chancellor originally thought 
that any new German troops would be part of a pan-European defense force, 
the European Defense Community. This idea died in 1954, but well before then 
Chancellor Adenauer and his advisors had recognized that German forces, 
whether part of a European force or independent, would need to be accepted 
by the German public as well as hy the Western AHL:s.6 
The concepts of Innere Fuehrung were developed along with the organiza­
tional and operational plans for the armed forces during the 1950s and early 
1960s in a series of meetings, seminars, and position papers. While a number 
of people, who included former Wehrmacht officers, academics, and 
politician'>, worked on the conceptualization of these ideas over the years, 
Innere Fuehrung became most closely associated in the public's mind with 
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Wolf Graf von Baudissin. Baudissin, who was a former Wehrmacht officer, 
provided some of the earliest input for the concepts that would become Innere 
Fuehrung, and he became its chief advocate, especially among civilians.7 
While the Federal Republic's constitution or "Basic Law" had to be amended 
to address the requirements of the armed forces, and separate legislation was 
enacted to clarify the legal position of the soldier, the basis for the concept of 
lnnere Fuehrung was stated in the first article of the Basic Law as it was written 
in 1949: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall 
be the duty of all state authority ... 8 This personal dignity is not lost when one 
becomes a soldier. The soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as 
necessary to carry out his military duties. The soldier is a "citizen in uniform" 
(Staatsbuerger in Uniform). Although not a revolutionary concept for an 
American soldier, the idea of treating a soldier as a citizen was a key agent for 
change in a military tradition which, while it had developed superb fighting 
men, had also subjected them to the harsh, often meaningless discipline of the 
drill square.9 As Theodor Blank, first Minister of Defense of the German 
Federal Republic, said: "Whoever is unable, as an officer, NCO, or reserve 
officer to impart his military skills and knowledge to recruits without treating 
them as free citizens will have no place with us ... 10 
The soldier also "has the duty to serve the Federal Republic of Germany 
loyally and to defend courageously the rights and freedom of the German 
people ... II He must acknowledge and accept the principles of democracy as 
expressed in the Basic Law and dedicate himself to their preservation. 12 These 
principles include civilian control of the military (Primat der PoUtik). Further­
more, the soldier is not to follow orders which assault human dignity or would 
otherwise be illegal.13 This places the responsibility on the soldier to keep 
himself informed, so as to be in the position to think critically about the orders 
he receives and act accordingly. The soldier is to be treated as a thinking 
indi vidual, worthy of respect, and capable of understanding the purpose behind 
an order. Indeed, he must understand its purpose if he is to carry out his duties 
as a soldier in a democratic society. This understanding goes beyond knowing 
how to complete a military mission and showing initiative in carrying it out, 
attributes which German soldiers displayed in pre-Bundeswehr armies. It 
includes the soldier's understanding of the moral and social consequences of 
his actions. Theodor Blank again expressed it best: "Democracy can be 
defended only by democrats, and freedom only by those who experience it 
themselves ... 14 
Baudissin wished to embed the soldier firmly in the democratic society and 
to leave as little as possible in the purely military sphere. The plan was to keep 
uniforms simple, with little in the way of medals and ribbons, and to keep 
5 
The Newport Papers 
ceremonies and parades to a minimum. Military tradition was a thorny matter, 
because although as Samuel Huntington has noted, " ... civil-military relations 
[in Germany] between 1871 and 1914 reflected an extraordinary degree of 
objective civilian control and military professionalism founded upon a high 
level and restricted scope of military authority ... ,',15 the armed forces' 
political manipulations during and after the First World War and their cul­
pability in the National Socialist regime hardly furnished material for the 
tradition of an army in a democratic society. 
Traditions worthy of study and emulation were eventually found. These 
included the heroes of the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon and the General 
Staff officers who conspired to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. However, 
these latter were not uncontroversial, and the whole question of what constitutes 
a valid tradition for the German armed forces still remains open today. 16 It 
should be noted that the leadership's decision that the Reichswehr and 
Wehrmacht had no traditions worthy of being honored by the Bundeswehr did 
not cause their memory to wither away, and this problem must be kept in mind 
when addressing the legacy of the NV A. 
Although problems with tradition are only one of its shortcomings, Innere 
Fuehrung did in fact, especially during the first years of the Bundeswehr, 
provide a framework within which the armed forces could grow. It gave them 
a mission-the defense of the democratic society within the framework of 
NATO, which was acceptable to the German public, if not highly popular. 
Indeed, this acceptance seemed to grow over time until, by the early 1980s, 80 
percent of the population favored German membership in NATOY Innere 
Fuehrung also defined the rights and responsibilities of leaders and soldiers to 
each other and to the society as a whole. It provided a humane and highly 
effective leadership philosophy. And finally, it helped assure West Germans 
that the armed services were under civilian control and were an instrument of 
a democratic society. 
In order to achieve acceptance, however, the armed services, through Innere 
Fuehrung, have tied themselves so closely to civil society that they are some­
times indistinguishable from it. This has opened them to conservative criticism 
that argues that armed forces who have accepted the values of a society that 
emphasizes personal, material prosperity, and who seek to avoid hard choices 
in international affairs, no longer have the necessary military ethos. 18 That this 
is not a peculiarly German concern is evident from the headline of an article by 
Harry Summers in which he expresses the worry that "Humanitarian Missions 
Could Signal Collapse of 'Fighting Spirit' .. for the U.S. armed forces. In the 
article he quotes T. R. Fehrenback favorably that "by the very nature of its 











world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be, 
to die.,,19 Whether a society is described as being materialist or humane, it is 
necessary to recognize a tension between a society and its military, which the 
teachings of lnnere Fuehrung may have glossed over. 
This blurring of the distinctions between civil and military cultures may lead 
to soldiers' viewing their service as more a job than a profession. In tenns of 
Charles Moskos' institutional-occupational continuum of how militaries view 
themselves, the Bundeswehr is well over to the occupational side of the 
spectrum.20 This attitude is nurtured among the officers by a military university 
system that does not teach military science and does not require students to wear 
uniforms,21 and by a conscription system that does not require them to serve 
far from home. Many conscripted soldiers sleep at home and come and go from 
duty "just like civilian employees.,,22 While most officers and senior noncom­
missioned officers of the Bundeswehr have developed a professional view of 
themselves and their duties, most of the junior noncommissioned officers and 
soldiers retain a "nine-to-five" attitude that does not mesh well with the 
requirements placed on modem military establishments. 
Effective training is needed if lnnere Fuehrung is to be functional and, in 
actuality, the training available is largely inadequate. The courses in social 
science and education, which are provided by the military universities in 
Hamburg and Munich, are supposed to provide officers with the wherewithal 
to lead and train "citizens in uniform" effectively but are often considered 
make-work courses that get in the way of the officer-student's work in his major 
area of study.23 Political education is a command responsibility in the troop 
units, and soldiers are to receive twelve hours per quarter of instruction covering 
such topics as "Parliamentary Democracy," "The Bundeswehr in State and 
Society," "the Bundeswehr within the Alliance," and "Other Social Systems," 
but a 1979 study found that training was often canceled, not adequately 
prepared, and not always conducted by the company commander.24 Under 
normal conditions it is difficult for commanders to fit such training into 
schedules already crowded with normal duty and combat training requirements, 
and in the experience of at least one senior officer who served as deputy 
commander of a new home defense brigade in Brandenburg, in the early months 
after unification it was almost impossible to meet the formal requirements for 
political awareness training among the troops in the East, although informally 
a great deal of this was happening.25 
Possibly the harshest criticism of lnnere Fuehrung from the Left, and the 
least deserved, has been that it was essentially a hate campaign that used a 
distorted picture of the enemy as all things evil (Feindbild) to motivate the 
soldier. Such criticism sometimes more betrayed the critic's wishful thinking 
7 
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about benign developments in the German Democratic Republic than 
demonstrated the plausibility of any conscious attempt on the part of the 
Bundeswehr leadership to distort the thinking of impressionable soldiers. Thus, 
in 1970, Siegfried Grimm took the armed forces to task for teaching soldiers 
that the GDR was a creature of the Soviet Union's political and strategic needs; 
that its leaders had no personal legitimacy; and that these unscrupulous leaders 
ruled through force and terror. He felt such oversimplifications disregarded the 
large part of the population which, while not supporting communist domination 
entirely, did support the structural changes to society that had occurred in the 
GDR since 1945. If people did want change, they did not want capitalism but 
merely a reform of the system. In any case the leadership had gained legitimacy, 
as it allowed citizens to take greater part in the decision-making process, and 
moreover, " ... the economic growth in recent years has greatly changed the 
picture of the GDR ... 
26 
Information presented to the troops in Bundeswehr literature and in training 
may have been simplistic-though it does seem to have described with greater 
accuracy conditions across the inter-German border than did its critics-but 
such information was not used to train soldiers to hate their opponents. In fact, 
the very absence of a view of the enemy as an evil entity may have been the 
single most effective element of lnnere Fuehrung in facilitating the Bundes­
wehr soldiers' acceptance of former NV A personnel into their ranks. 
27 
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D
ESPITE ITS PERCEIVED and some very real shortcomings, lnnere Fueh­
rung provided a foundation for the military in German society for almost 
forty years, and it played an essential role in making the Bundeswehr a very 
different sort of military than the National People's Army. Born of the West's 
need to have an ally against the Soviet Union and of Germany's to regain 
sovereignty, the Bundeswehr was unique in comparison to other militaries as 
well. As amended, the Basic Law provided armed forces for defense; estab­
lished a Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag, or parliamentary ombudsman 
(Wehrbeauftragter), to protect civil rights in the armed forces and to assist the 
parliament in exercising civilian control of the military ; established a civilian 
Administration of the Federal Armed Forces, which manages administrative 
and personnel matters often handled by uniformed personnel in other militaries; 
and severely limited the powers of military courts. It also laid out detailed 
instructions that authorized civilian leaders to determine when the country faced 
a threat that called for a military defense, at which time command of the military 
would be transferred from the defense minister to the chancellor.28 
From the beginning, the country's political leadership recognized that these 
armed forces would act only in concert with their allies in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and it also came to be accepted that this military's real 
mission was deterrence. It would be successful if it never actually had to fight 
the war for which it was constantly preparing. Thanks in large measure to its 
very success in this endeavor, as well as to the antimilitarist sentiments of the 
generations following the war, the Bundeswehr has faced recurring problems 
of public acceptance, beginning with the "without me" (Ohne mich) attitude of 
young men in the 1950s and extending through the attacks of the radicals in the 
sixties and the rearmament debate of the late seventies and early eighties. 
Throughout all the public debate has run the fear that the military has not learned 
its lesson and still threatens to become a state within a state . Aside from some 
foolish actions on the part of individual military men and equally foolish 
reactions in the press,29 there is little indication that this is a real threat. Across 
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the inter-Gennan border, however, another Gennan anny was a key element of 
a party organization that was in fact a state within a state. 
The single most important thing to understand about the National People's 
Anny is that, despite its name, it did not owe its loyalty so much to its people 
or its nation as to the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands, or SED). The NV A had its beginnings in the Gennan People's 
Police, which in the summer of 1948, at the behest of the Soviet Union, began 
building so-called "garrisoned police" units. The leadership for the garrisoned 
police came from the officer corps of the defeated Wehnnacht, as did the 
original leadership for the Bundeswehr and by the end of 1950 there were over 
70,000 personnel in these police units. They were trained and equipped as 
military units so that when in January 1956 the Chamber of People's Deputies 
of the GDR passed the "Law concerning the Creation of the National People's 
Anny and the Ministry for National Defense," anned forces were already on 
hand. 3D 
When the Turning Point came in the fall of 1989, the NVA had an active 
force of 170,000 soldiers, sailors, and ainnen. Like the Bundeswehr, it 
depended on conscription, and young men were required to serve eighteen 
months. Unlike the Bundeswehr, the NV A was part of a society which itself had 
become regimented and militarized along the model of its Soviet big brother in 
arms. Beginning in kindergarten, extending through "pioneer organizations" 
for children between the ages of six and fourteen, and culminating in member­
ship in the Free Gennan Youth and the Society for Sport and Technology, young 
people were exposed to ideological indoctrination and training in basic military 
skills.31 In 1976 the chainnan of the latter organization, a lieutenant general, 
could say, " ... nearly 95 per cent of all young men between 16 and 18 each 
year take part in the Society's pre-military courses.,,32 How effective the 
training and indoctrination were is open to question, but it did bring service in 
the NV A into the seamless whole of a world view shared by all the official 
leaders and organizations of the society. 
East Gennany's world view of itself was that of a state at the forefront of the 
socialist revolution, in alliance with the Soviet Union and its other allies of the 
Warsaw Pact, and envied and under attack by the reactionary forces of the West, 
especially the Federal Republic of Gennany, which the East considered to be 
the successor state to Hitler's Third Reich. Because of the early collaboration 
of Gennan communist party members, such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm 
Pieck, with the Soviet Union, and their subsequent coming to power in the GDR, 
the leadership of the country could downplay the history of national socialism 
and stress the GDR's connection to all the progressive aspects of Gennany's 
history. Through this interpretation of history, the GDR and its social system 
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became the ultimate goals of Gennan history, and anything that did not support 
this view became a non-event. 
This "world view" had the advantage of not forcing the citizens of the GDR 
to confront the uncomfortable recent events in Gennan history, and it allowed 
the NV A to make use of traditions the Bundeswehr would have found embar­
rassing. Thus, while the Bundeswehr consciously sought to break with the past 
in its selection of a modem, simple unifonn, the NV A's unifonn was strongly 
reminiscent of the Wehrmacht's. While Baudissin sought to fmd republican 
traditions among the Prussian refonners of the Wars of Liberation, the NV A 
brought the Prussian generals into its pantheon en masse on their reputations 
as military men who were part of the "progressive" tradition of the NV A. 33 In 
July 1990 Lieutenant General Klaus Juergen Baarss, Deputy to the Secretary 
of Defense and Disannament for Military Refonn, still defended what he 
considered to be Prussian virtues, such as duty and honor, and Prussian features 
in unifonns and ceremonies. 34 
Such an understanding of history had the disadvantage that an unexamined 
past allowed old attitudes and activities to live on in the new anned forces. The 
introduction of Soviet military concepts of discipline and organization rein­
forced these attitudes. The soldier's welfare was not his commander's primary 
concern, and that famous first impression Bundeswehr officers had on their 
visits to NV A installations, that the tanks were kept in heated bays while the 
soldiers lived in run-down barracks without showers or any other amenities,3S 
had as much to do with the NV A's failure to overcome its past as it had to do 
with the general poverty of the society. The abusive harassment of the old drill 
square reemerged in the image of the "EK" system ("EK" is Entlassungskan­
didat or "candidate for discharge"), an approach similar to the Soviet Anny's 
in which the more senior conscript soldiers forced newer conscripts to work for 
them and to do demeaning make-work jobs. 36 This was allowed in the name of 
discipline. 
The acceptance of a world view of socialism under constant danger of attack 
also lent itself to the sort of hate campaign the Bundeswehr was accused of 
running. The NV A soldier swore not only to serve the GDR, but" ... to defend 
socialism against all enemies and to stake my life for the achievement of 
victory. ,,37 Thus, the enemy was not merely whoever infringed on the legitimate 
security interests of the state-the enemy and the interests being subject to 
change-but was a specific, unchanging social and economic class and its 
lackeys. 
In published materials and political education classes, NV A personnel were 
told that in NATO they faced the strongest imperialist coalition in the world 
and that the Federal Republic with its Bundeswehr was its spearpoint. The 
1 1  
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Bundeswehr was portrayed as a direct descendant of Gennan militarism: it 
secured the power of the monopoly capitalist class within the Federal Republic 
and planned to undo the results of the Second World War through a war of 
aggression when the time was ripe. NV A soldiers were infonned that West 
Gennan children were raised on a diet of nationalism, revanchism, and 
anticommunism to prepare them for service as unthinking mercenaries in the 
Bundeswehr, and that lnnere Fuehrung, along with pastoral care of soldiers, 
prepared them psychologically and ideologically for the war against 
socialism. 38 
Such NV A indoctrination went so far that in some units and branch schools 
political officers set up rooms for "the political and psychological preparation 
of soldiers for war." Along with flashing lights, taped sounds of combat, and 
gruesomely realistic battle scenes, soldiers saw photo displays of the inequities 
and violence of the capitalist system (e.g., starving children, unemployed 
workers, strikes, riots) and of war scenes (e.g., Vietnam and Hiroshima). 
Sometimes these rooms were separated, one having to do with the stress of war 
(Stresskabinett) and the other dealing with only images of the enemy 
(Feindbildkabinett).39 
There is some question as to how effective this fonn of indoctrination was. 
The picture may have been painted so black that no one could accept it as 
reality.40 NVA soldiers, as do soldiers in all armies, may have ignored subjects 
that had little to do with their actual duties. It is difficult to believe, however, 
that the constant reiteration of these themes did not have some effect. Fonner 
NV A Rear Admiral Guenther Poerschel feels that the pictures and reports of 
United States' military action in Korea, Vietnam, and the Near East played the 
major role in validating one's choice of the military profession and that heavily 
edited reports from the Western media, which emphasized NATO's strength 
and were harshly critical of the socialist states, had a profound effect on those 
who were constantly exposed to such indoctrination.41 If nothing else, the 
NV A's mission to protect and advance the cause of socialism legitimized the 
anned services' close association with the Socialist Unity Party. 
In the eyes of the East Gennan populace, the officers' association with the 
Communist Party and their prior position.<; of leadership in "a privileged 
institution of the SED ruled state,,42 are what make the rehabilitation of even 
the small number of officers the Bundeswehr took over from the NV A so 
difficult. Practically all NV A officers (98 percent) were party members, as were 
many of the noncommissioned officers (56 percent of the career noncommis­
sioned officers).43 They carried out political as well as military duties, and 
failure to carry out a military duty could be considered a political transgression; 
a political failing in tum could lead to loss of party membership and consequent 
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career failure. Less than total support for the SED and its policies could lead to 
dire consequences. For criticizing military intervention in Poland to put down 
the Solidarity movement, Lieutenant Colonel Klaus Wiegand, a history instruc­
tor at the Wilhelm Pieck Institute with twenty-five years of service, was 
summarily degraded to the lowest enlisted rank and thrown out of the party. 44 
For an officer, a career without membership in and support of the SED was 
virtually unthinkable.45 
On the Soviet model, the party had parallel structures for the various levels 
of the military hierarchy. The SED and the Free Gennan Youth had organiza­
tions down to the battalion level, and since soldiers came into the service out 
of the youth movement, the majority of them remained members of it while in 
unifonn.46 As noted above, officers were expected to be members of the SED 
and to take part in its activities. This career requirement has led to the present 
rationalization among many fonner NV A officers that since everyone belonged, 
membership is basically meaningless in detennining an officer's true beliefs. 
One made the decision to be a professional soldier and officer out of the desire 
to be in the military; party membership was merely a necessary condition of 
this service.47 
This may be so, or it may be one of a number of examples of these officers' 
attempts to rationalize their behavior in the light of what happened and what 
they now know about the regime they served. In any case, some of the more 
discerning of these officers note that, although membership was practically 
automatic and at first essentially a passive acceptance of the state of affairs, 
officers, especially the successful ones, tended to become functionaries in the 
party organizations at their levels of command, thus becoming ever more 
closely identified with the party and its aims as their careers progressed. By 
grooming the best officers, especially those in the command track, for party 
leadership, the SED achieved two objectives simultaneously: it identified the 
best officers with the party and its goals in the minds of their contemporaries 
and subordinates, and it provided an effective means for the party to control 
those in leadership functions.48 Thus, whether a fonner NVA officer wishes to 
admit it or not, membership in the SED takes on a significance beyond simply 
careerism. 
The SED and youth organizations were organized in parallel to the military 
apparatus. Within the military itself, party influence was represented by the 
political officers, who were to be found at every level in the company. To view 
these officers, of whom there were about 6,000 in the NV A, as being of the same 
mold as the Red Anny commissars of the Russian Revolution and its attendant 
civil wars would be inaccurate. They were of course, highly dedicated and did 
work to indoctrinate the troops politically. Although these officers were 
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subordinate to their commanding officers, they carried a great deal of leverage 
in that they could always approach a political officer at a higher level of 
command than their own commanding officer and request intervention that a 
decision with which they disagreed be overturned. For that reason, and because 
a political officer was always in a position to report a commander's mistake as 
a party failing, commanders dealt very carefully with their political officers. 
The commanders also, however, depended a great deal upon their political 
officers. 
Far more important than his political activities, as far as the commander and 
the troops were concerned, the political officer in the NV A, as in other Warsaw 
Pact countries, provided for the morale and welfare of the soldiers in his unit. 
The political officer worked out the leave schedule. If a soldier was having 
difficulties at home or had a financial problem, he went to the political officer, 
and not to his commander, who was generally considered unapproachable. 
Matters that in Western armies are considered command responsibilities and in 
which U.S. Anny commanders at all levels are directly involved were relegated 
to individual political officers at company level, and to political staffs at 
battalion level and above.49 
Commanders were so dependent upon their political officers for the care of 
their troops that, as communist regimes died in the Warsaw Pact, the political 
officers underwent a slight metamorphosis and were kept on. They became 
responsible for "civics" instead of political indoctrination; the names of the 
schools where they were trained were changed (the Lenin Academy in Moscow 
to the "Humanitarian Academy" and the Wilhelm Pieck Military and Political 
Institute in Berlin to the "Institute for Civic Education"); and courses in 
Marxism-Leninism disappeared in favor of the social sciences. But officers 
with the duties of political officers, if not in name, have nonetheless remained 
in the armies of all fonner Warsaw Pact countries, except the fonner GDR. 
Russian Navy ships' captains have even been reported to refuse to leave home 
port without their political officers. 50 
Opinions differ as to whether these officers were political creatures who 
otherwise would have been failures in the military or were the cream of the 
crop, chosen precisely because of their intelligence and communications skills. 
There is evidence that they were among the first to understand the impact of 
the Turning Point on the NV A and to attempt to do something to bring the NV A 
into step with its changing society.51 Whether these officers were good or bad, 
it remains that the system insidiously integrated the SED, in the person of the 
political officer, into the most important relationship of trust-that between the 
commander and the soldier-consequently turning the soldier's loyalty toward 
the party and away from his chain of command. The consequence for the leader, 
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who had primarily to concern himself with the tactical mission and less with 
the well-being of his troops, was alienation from his soldiers. 
The NVA's leadership philosophy was patterned on the Soviet style of 
leadership. Mission-type orders, in which the soldier is given a mission and 
expected to use his own initiative to complete it, were not given; directives left 
little to the commander's initiative, much less the noncommissioned officer's 
or private soldier's. Part of this was due to a compartmentalized organizational 
structure in which staff officers had direct access and command authority within 
their competencies over their counterparts in subordinate staffs. There were 
eighteen technical areas in which this "pipeline" leading past the commander 
to his own subordinates existed,52 and the system led to a lack of flexibility and 
initiative and to a swelling in the number of staff officers far beyond that of 
Western armies in comparable organizations. These officers had very cir­
cumscribed jurisdictions and often carried out duties performed by a noncom­
missioned officer in the West, such as running a dining facility or a supply room. 
Since rank was essentially only pay grade and was not associated with specific 
duties or responsibilities, an officer could rise to senior rank and never change 
his job. Whether one was a commander or a staff officer, the opportunities to 
use one's own judgment and take independent action were few. 
Whatever personal frustration individual officers may have felt within such 
a system, the officer corps was a privileged class within the society. It received 
priority for housing, a separate economy saw to its needs, and a system of 
monetary rewards and bonuses boosted officers' salaries above those of their 
contemporaries in the civilian economy.53 Other advantages, such as early 
retirement with a good pension, the opportunity upon retirement to cross over 
to comparable employment in the civilian sector, and more frequent access to 
state-run vacation resorts, all indicated the special status of the officer corps. 54 
This privileged status was paid for, however, by near-total isolation from the 
civilian community and from any source of information other than that provided 
or approved by the state, and also by long duty hours, extreme readiness 
requirements, and the knowledge that one's personal as well as one's profes­
sionallife was subject to intrusive observation. Military families usually lived 
in separate housing projects and were forbidden to watch West German 
television or to have contacts with West Germans. Although the rest of the 
population was not supposed to watch or listen to Western broadcasts either, 
this ban was normally broken by the civilian population, while many former 
NV A officers insist they felt duty-bound not to watch. In any case, for an officer, 
being caught conversing with information available only from the West, or 
being reported by one of the many State Security (Stasi) informers for having 
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watched or listened to Western broadcasts would mean the end of one's 
career.55 
Bundeswehr leaders have been surprised at the number of Stasi informers 
within the officer corps alone. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of those 
selected for career or long-term service in the Bundeswehr will be forced to 
resign, as separate investigations by the Gauck commission, charged with 
examining all State Security files, uncover their connection with the StasL56 
The Stasi's Administration 2000, the organization responsible for monitoring 
the NY A, had a formal presence down to the regimental level and informants 
throughout the companies and platoons. Even a soldier who was not an 
informant would feel the pressure to report infractions if someone else knew 
he was aware of them, fearing that the other person might be an informer who 
would lodge an accusation that the soldier did not report the incident. Electronic 
eavesdropping was also widespread and was facilitated by the concentration of 
officers in housing areas. Western observers were astonished at the complacen­
cy with which such eavesdropping was accepted. 57 
The housing areas also facilitated the NVA's high degree of readiness. 
Eighty-five percent of the personnel of each unit in the NY A stood ready in the 
barracks at all times. Officers not on duty on the installation could be alerted 
by sirens in the housing areas and had to be in the unit within twenty minutes 
of the alarms' sounding. All vehicles were kept topped off with fuel and under 
full combat load of ammunition at all times, because the unit had to be able to 
depart the installation within one or two hours; most units could quit their 
barracks in less than the allotted time. Traffic signals were installed at the exits 
from the motor pools to allow split-second traffic coordination. There is no 
doubt that the NY A's ability to quit its installations on alert and reach its 
assembly areas rapidly and in good order would have been difficult for the 
Bundeswehr to duplicate, especially on a weekend or holiday, but this ability 
exacted a heavy price. 
The high degree of around-the-clock readiness meant little free time for 
soldiers, noncommissioned officers, or officers. Leaves were carefully planned 
and subject to last-minute cancellation should sickness or other absences reduce 
the unit's personnel strength below 85 percent. It was difficult to keep the 
soldiers gainfully employed with training and maintenance for such long 
periods of time, and the boredom and close quarters probably encouraged the 
harassment of young soldiers through the "EK" system. Moreover, since 
NATO's attack would come at the least expected moment, special emphasis was 
placed on readiness on such holidays as Christmas, separating families while 
soldiers waited for the attack that never came.58 
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Since NV A intelligence and thus the political and military leadership of the 
GDR knew that NATO, and particularly the Bundeswehr, were neither planning 
to nor were positioned to attack, there must have been other reasons for the 
insistence on constant readiness. The obvious reason, besides the fact that the 
Soviet forces insisted upon it, was that it was an integral part of the ideology. 
Socialism was under threat of attack from the forces of capitalism, and no 
sacrifice to protect it was too great. A more subtle reason is advanced by Frithjof 
Knabe, who feels that it was equally important to occupy officers and men 
totally with the day-to-day problems of maintaining readiness, so as to keep 
them from questioning the system that demanded these sacrifices. S9 It is 
certainly true that this emphasis on readiness perforce isolated the soldiers from 
the populace, as did the parallel insistence on extreme secrecy, which kept the 
installations closed to civilians and off the maps. Also, it facilitated the state's 
control of the information the soldiers received. Once on the installation, the 
troops were severed from all sources of information other than those sanctioned 
by the state. 
Two very different armed forces faced each other across the inter-German 
border. One had made a conscious effort to deal, however incompletely, with 
its past, and sought to be a part of the society that it defended. The other did not 
come to terms with its past or with its position of privilege within its society. 
The rapidity of events leading up to and following the fall of the Wall in 
November 1989, which led to unification, caught both armies unprepared but 








The Turning Point 
A
s THE EIGHTIES WORE ON and Premier Gorbachev's refonns took hold 
in the Soviet Union, events there and in other Warsaw Pact countries, 
especially Poland, began to raise questions in the minds of some NV A officers 
about the future of the GDR and its armed forces. For some of them the moment 
of truth seems to have arrived while attending the General Staff Academy in 
Moscow; for those who had attended courses there in the seventies, the decay 
of the system upon their return in the eighties was evident. In 1988 an NVA 
officer's wife wrote home from Moscow that the GDR had no more than one 
year left to exist. For others, the light of reality came with the NVA's role in 
putting down the riots in Dresden in September 1989, which took place as the 
trains with the East German refugees from the West German embassy in Prague 
passed through on their way to the Federal Republic.60 As the demonstrations 
grew in scope and took on the character of a revolution that could bring down 
the state, the NV A was placed in readiness for a so-called "Beijing solution." It 
became a point of pride among NV A officers that it did not come to such a 
solution, but there is a continuing debate about whether the NV A would have 
fired upon German civilians if so ordered.61 
On 7 November 1989 the government of Egon Krenz, Erich Honecker's 
successor of three weeks, resigned, and on 9 November the Berlin Wall was 
opened. The professional soldiers of the NV A, officers and noncommissioned 
officers, went through severe psychological shock as the regime to which they 
had dedicated their lives, for which they had made substantial sacrifices of time 
and effort, and not unimportantly, from which they had derived many privileges 
and benefits, feU without a struggle. They experienced further shock when they 
discovered that the Bundeswehr, against whose attack they had so long prepared 
and because of which they had made these sacrifices, had never planned to 
attack and that the regime they had served loyally had consistently lied to them . 
Compounding this severe blow to its morale and its understanding of itself, 
the leadership of the NV A was faced with the need to reform the armed services 
immediately in order to bring them in line with a state governed by democratic 
principles. Now the attempt had to be made to build a new relationship, without 
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socialist, internationalist content, between leader and led, to ftnd a tradition that 
supported "values like peace, freedom, and democracy, ,,62 terms also now 
devoid of socialist, internationalist content, and make the military palatable to 
a newly empowered, anti-militarist citizenry. The logical source for information 
on such matters was the Bundeswehr, but the armies dealt warily with each 
other. Offtcial guidance concerning contact between the armed forces of the 
two states did not go into effect until 1 June 1 990.63 Personal, unofftcial contact, 
however, took place before that. 
In May 1 990, while on leave and dressed in jeans and leather jacket, Colonel 
Hans-Peter von Kirchbach appeared at an NV A installation in Dresden, showed 
his Bundeswehr identiftcation, and requested entrance. Although this ftrst 
encounter was met with hesitancy, the visit resulted in an exchange of cor­
respondence, a plan to exchange visits of offtcers, and a request for a brieftng 
on Innere Fuehrung from the staff offtcers of the 7th NV A Armored Division 
in Dresden.64 Much earlier, in January 1 990, and at greater risk to himself, the 
NVA political offtcer, Major Frithjof Knabe, had taken the overnight train from 
Leipzig to Koblenz, placing his career and livelihood in the balance to search 
for the outside assistance he felt the NV A needed if it were to learn how to be 
an army in a democracy. 
Since he was part of a ftfty-man division of political offtcers on the staff of 
a corps-sized military district, Knabe took it for granted that a Bundeswehr 
corps would have an equivalent staff in its headquarters. In Koblenz he reported 
to the headquarters of the III Corps of the Bundeswehr and was taken to the G2 
(intelligence offtcer), who in tum sent him to the Center for Innere Fuehrung. 
As he had always been taught that Innere Fuehrung was the training that made 
soldiers amenable to manipulation by capitalists in their wars of aggression, he 
was more than a little concerned about being trapped in the center responsible 
for the dissemination of this doctrine. Knabe was surprised by the openness and 
helpfulness with which he was greeted, and he returned by train to Leipzig that 
night with a wealth of material and promises of assistance once he had digested 
the information. 
Upon reporting his contact with the Bundeswehr to his superiors, Knabe was 
relieved of duties and threatened with expulsion from the military. He fought 
this action by building a "citizens' initiative" and by threatening the NV A with 
adverse publicity. Members of this citizens' initiative and one of Knabe 's 
superiors met with a small group of offtcers from the Center for Innere 
Fuehrung in March at Knabe's apartment. This was one of a number of 
spontaneous attempts on the part of NV A offtcers to learn how to reform their 
armed forces. Reforms were doomed to failure, however, because the leader­
ship of the NV A did not change; it was precisely this leadership that had the 
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greatest interest in protecting the status quo for as long as possible.65 When the 
generals and senior officers were not released from service following the GDR's 
first free elections on 18 March 1 990, and the new Minister for Disarmament 
and Defense, Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, took no effective action, hopes for 
meaningful change in the armed forces ebbed.66 
From its inception, the new free German Democratic Republic was seen as 
a transition state to German unity. On 28 November 1989 Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl provided the Bundestag a ten-point program for German and European 
unity. However, even optimists thought in terms of years of slow, deliberate 
integration of the two states and that during this period a down-sized NV A would 
provide a bridge to the Warsaw Pact armies. In April 1990, Rupert Scholz 
suggested a "step-by-step" integration process in the "mid-term" through which 
the NVA first would leave the Warsaw Pact, then combine with non-NATO 
Bundeswehr units, and possibly become part of a European multi-national 
force.67 At an NVA commanders' conference in Strausberg on 2 May 1 990, 
Disarmament and Defense Minister Eppelmann said that as long as there were 
two military blocs, the NV A must continue to exist in order to avoid a "military 
vacuum" on the territory of the GDR.68 
Even as it became clear that unity was going to come more rapidly than 
originally expected, the hope remained alive within the NVA that it would 
somehow continue to exist as a separate entity, at least for a short time. As late 
as August 1 990 Minister Eppelmann was still talking about a separate army in 
the new states, even after unification.69 There is precedent in German history 
for annies becoming contingents of other armies rather than disbanding. It 
happened extensively during the wars of unification after 1866 and 187 1 ,  and 
noble officers in the armies of the German states prior to unification often 
moved from army to army without giving up rank or privilege. This, however, 
was before the age of ideology, and thoughts of retaining the NV A or units of 
the NV A did not take into account that it had thoroughly discredited itself with 
both the political leadership in Bonn and the East German civilian population. 
The NV A had also become increasingly uncontrollable. Conscript service 
was cut from eighteen to twelve months, civilian substitute service was intro­
duced, readiness requirements were cut from 85 percent to 50 percent, and 
soldiers took part in demonstrations and refused to carry out orders with which 
they disagreed.70 Without the authority of the state and party, officers and 
noncommissioned officers were hard put to discipline their soldiers. Citizens ' 
initiatives were organized to challenge military authority, as the concept of an 
"army in a democracy" was understood to mean a democratic army. Once it 
became obvious that the Germanys would be unified in October 1 990, and 
rumors that questioned the future of the NV A began to circulate, discipline 
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became even more difficult to impose. By the time of unification, in the words 
of one fonner NV A officer, the NV A was little more than "a band of robbers." 7 1  
There were officers who prided themselves on having maintained some fonn 
of discipline and in handing over their units in good order to the new Bundes­
wehr commanders, although even they were ashamed at the indiscipline of 
many of their soldiers.72 
The leaders of the Bundeswehr were also caught unawares by the Turning 
Point. According to Lieutenant General von Scheven, they were " . . .  making 
preparations for something completely different, namely improving their 
conventional defense capabilities, maintaining their peacetime strength and 
increasing their basic tenn of service from 1 5  to 1 8  months.'.73 Although in 
mid-June Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic 
of Gennany, had called for "one state-one anny," the leadership was still 
thinking of Gennan unity in the long tenn and in any case had to refrain from 
fonnal planning for unity due to its diplomatic sensitivity. Then on 1 6  July 1 990 
Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev agreed on a fonnula which allowed a 
united Gennany to remain in NATO, reduced the Bundeswehr to 370,000 
troops, and cleared the way for almost immediate German unity and 
sovereignty .74 In a curious parallel to the speed with which the Bundeswehr 
had had to develop in the 1 950s, cutting almost in half the six years that the 
buildup was supposed to take, the Bundeswehr in 1 990 was faced with the 
challenge of planning and beginning to execute its unprecedented mission in 
the East within less than three months.7s 
Following discussion with his chiefs of staff and other military advisors, 
Minister Stoltenberg laid down the guidelines for what was to happen after 2 
October 1990. The NV A was to cease to exist, and its soldiers would become 
for the time being soldiers of the Bundeswehr, subject to the regulations and 
federal laws under which it operated. The units of the NV A would stand down 
to be replaced by Bundeswehr units made up of a mix of old Bundeswehr and 
fonner NVA personnel. Approximately 20,000 career and long-tenn soldiers 
(i.e.,  officers and noncommissioned officers) of the NV A could be accepted to 
serve for two years in the Bundeswehr with the possibility of further service to 
be determined at a later time. Draftees who had been called into the NV A on 1 
September would be trained according to Bundeswehr standards. A provisional 
joint command, the Bundeswehr Command, East would initially have com­
mand and control of all anned forces in the new states and work directly for the 
Minister of Defense, thereby keeping these forces outside the NATO command 
structure, a prerequisite for troops serving in the new states until the departure 
of all Soviet forces by 1994. The commander of Bundeswehr Command, East 
would be Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm.76 
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A small liaison group from the Bundeswehr took up its duties with the GDR' s 
Ministry for Disarmament and Defense on 20 September, to be followed after 
reunification by 693 Bundeswehr officers, who essentially took over command 
of NV A units down through division level. At least 30 percent of the commands 
at battalion level were to be in Western hands, including at least one company 
in each battalion. Although by this time the NV A had shrunk to approximately 
103,000 soldiers (including 32,000 officers and 20,000 noncommissioned 
officers), when one includes the key staff positions that had to be taken over by 
Bundeswehr officers from the West, there were comparatively few Bundeswehr 
officers for the number of positions to be filled. In some cases there was only 
one West German officer in a unit.77 Although additional help, especially 
noncommissioned officers, would later come from the West, the initial com­
plement was kept small to avoid the imrression of a conquering occupation 
force dispossessing the vanquished foe.7 
Although they were volunteers, some of these officers had second thoughts 
about working with former NV A officers, and in some cases first impressions 
seemed to justify their misgivings?9 Their thoughts mirrored the internal debate 
within the armed forces, which had been going on throughout the summer, about 
the NV A and the nature of its soldiers.80 If the officers of the Bundeswehr 
thought they were going to meet automatons who had supported a communist 
system out of deep conviction and would now need to be de-programmed, they 




The Legacy of the NV A 
B
y 3 OCTOBER the generals and admirals had already been dismissed from 
the NV A, as had been the political officers. Officers over fifty-five years 
of age had been allowed to retire. Then, too, many officers and noncommis­
sioned officers who had truly been convinced of the rightness of their cause and 
had no desire even to try to work with the Bundeswehr had already left as well. 
What the first cadre of Bundeswehr personnel found among the personnel and 
installations of the NY A and among the civilian population of the new German 
states was the true legacy of the National People's Army. 
The run-down barracks with twenty-man bays, furnished with cots, narrow 
lockers, and stools instead of chairs; the hoses and water buckets instead of 
showers; the unhygienic latrines and kitchens, often co-located-all were 
physical evidence of a system that treated the soldier as a cypher. The officers' 
practice of addressing soldiers up through senior noncommissioned ranks with 
the informal "du" was considered highly impolite in West German professional 
circles, and the hang-dog. sullen attitude of the conscripted soldiers who had 
begun their training under NY A standards testified as well to the system's lack 
of concern for personal dignity and worth.8 1  
The officers often lacked the basic elements of leadership expected of a 
Bundeswehr officer. In a controversial article in Truppenpraxis, the com­
mander of one of the new home defense brigades described his subordinates 
from the NY A as ". . . soldiers, whose behavior was characterized by an 
unknown mixture of trust in authority [and a] paralyzing lack of drive • . . .  who 
widely lacked initiative, elan and creative individuality. . . . They were in­
doctrinated with the deterministic Marxist philosophy and told it was science. 
This resulted in alarming educational deficits . . .  of former East German Army 
officers ... 82 One may argue whether Colonel Millotat should have made these 
remarks in so public a forum, but his observations coincided with the experience 
and perception of others.83 
Nor is it difficult to understand that having served in a system that did not 
reward. indeed would punish, the sort of traits Western armies look for in their 
leaders, coupled with the psychological shock of having served a failed society 
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and the need to adjust to a totally new set of rules of conduct would inhibit one's 
initiative and willingness to experiment. It must also be remembered that in the 
first months after unification, officers were waiting to see who would be 
accepted for two years of service with the Bundeswehr, and therefore, until the 
fall of 1992, officers faced the much tougher selection for career or long-term 
status. The pressure not to make mistakes in both of these periods was enor­
mous. 
Other legacies of the NV A among the soldiers were the "not my job" 
mind-set, caused by the severe compartmentalization of duties and specialties, 
a curious combination of lack of trust in the leadership, and the tendency to 
believe rumors and whatever appeared in the newspaper-arising, to some 
extent, from the absence of useful information from the chain of command 
during the waning months of the regime and previous access to only certain 
channels of information. There was also a tendency to train to "stopwatch" 
standards: whatever could be timed was drilled, checked, and rewarded. This 
attitude toward training and training standards probably arose from a zero­
defects philosophy in an army where error could be punished by the party, as 
well as by the military, and it led to outstanding performance in individual 
soldier skill training and in the ability to react to alerts already described; 
however, since the capacity to understand a commander's intent or to use 
originality in handling a mission could not be timed or checked easily and could 
lead to mistakes, these qualities were not inculcated in soldiers or leaders. 
Consequently, there is some question as to whether the NV A accomplished 
worthwhile training above the company level. 84 
The legacy of NV A among the civilian population was equally unfortunate 
and boded ill for the Bundeswehr's chances of securing support for the military 
among the citizens of the new states. Having closed themselves in their 
installations and housing areas away from the populace; having enjoyed visible 
privileges such as easier access to automobiles, televisions, and other consumer 
products; and having been perceived correctly as supporters of the SED and the 
socialist state, professional military men had built a wall of antipathy and 
resentment between the armed forces and the civilian populace, which the 
Bundeswehr would have to break down.85 The decision to allow some officers 
and noncommissioned officers from the NV A to remain in the Bundeswehr did 
not help this process.86 
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N DISCUSSING THE ROLE of Innere Fuehrung in the Bundeswehr's mission 
in the new states, one must keep in mind that it addressed a number of 
audiences. It had to address those in unifonn on 3 October 1990, especially 
those in leadership roles; it had to deal with the attitudes and needs of the young 
men in the new states who would be conscripted or recruited into the Bundes­
wehr and those who would become its officers and noncommissioned officers; 
and it had to come to tenns with the civilian population. Innere Fuehrung was 
realized in two ways: first, through fonnal training at the Center for Innere 
Fuehrung, in the troop or branch schools, and in the field; and second, through 
the personal example provided by soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, who had 
lived with the principles of Innere Fuehrung throughout their professional lives, 
who honestly believed in them and their effectiveness in providing a compass 
for the military in a democratic society and had internalized them to such a 
degree that these principles informed their actions and attitudes. 
Fonnal classes on Innere Fuehrung began in both the East and the West prior 
to unification. Officers from the Center for Innere Fuehrung, in civilian clothes, 
went east, and officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the NV A, in 
unifonn, went west, as the attempt was made to teach at least the essentials of 
Innere Fuehrung in forty-hour courses held at all of the branch schools.87 These 
were carried on after 3 October 1990 with emphasis upon personnel in leader­
ship positions. This was a rather chaotic time, because NV A officers were being 
given the opportunity and being encouraged to leave the service with a small 
severance payment or, if over fifty years of age, with a pension, in order to 
reduce the number who would have to be involuntarily cut at a later date. About 
60 percent of the 32,000 officers on hand on 3 October elected this option. 
Thanks to the uncertainties caused by the resignations, the schools would 
plan courses only to find that there were not enough officers left to support the 
class, or bus-loads of officers would appear for classes that had not been 
scheduled.88 The effort was made, however, because it was essential that the 
former NV A officers and noncommissioned officers who remained on active 
duty have some idea of the Bundeswehr structure, procedures, and discipline. 
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The emphasis was on their understanding that a military in a democracy did not 
mean a democratic military and that, although leadership styles were different, 
leaders still had authority. 89 
By the early spring of 199 1 ,  about 6,000 of the approximately 1 1 ,000 former 
NV A officers who had requested to serve a two-year probation period in the 
Bundeswehr were informed that their applications had been accepted.90 Those 
who were not accepted left the service in the following months. Those accepted 
had already experienced a reduction in rank (often as many as two pay grades) 
in order to bring them into step with the Bundeswehr's promotion system, which 
was a great deal slower than the NV A's had been. These officers could now 
request consideration for professional status in order to remain in the service 
indeftnitely. For these officers, much would depend on the single officer 
efficiency report they would receive from their commanders the following 
April, as well as on the fmdings of the independent Gauck commission, which 
was searching for evidence of Stasi collaboration. 
Officers in leadership positions and noncommissioned officers, the majority 
of whose requests for two-year service status had been accepted because of the 
shortage of noncommissioned officers in the new states, underwent "sup­
plemental training," which consisted of courses at an officers' or noncommis­
sioned officers' school to bring them up to the level of leadership ability 
corresponding with their ranks, courses at a branch school to become proftcient 
with the duties required by their positions, and practical experience with their 
sister units in the older states before returning for duty with their own com­
mands. For fteld grade staff officers, however, this training consisted of a 
two-week course on Innere Fuehrung and on-the-job training.91  
A typical course would begin with an introduction to the principles of  Innere 
Fuehrung, then concentrate on leadership for the next two days. Subjects 
covered under the heading of leadership included leading through mission-type 
orders and by example, providing for the welfare of the soldier, responsibility 
for subordinates, the tension between individual freedom and duty accomplish­
ment, group dynamics, views of oneself and of others, and interpersonal 
communication. These officers were made familiar with their legal rights and 
duties as soldiers through classes covering the constitutional basis for the 
Bundeswehr, legal protections for the soldier (to include the parliamentary 
ombudsman and complaint procedures) , the legal basis for giving orders and 
what constitutes a legal order, and the responsibilities of a superior officer. 
Finally, they learned the principles of political training in the Bundeswehr and 
about the resource of counseling and care, which they had not had available to 
them in the NV A. Much of this was done through practical exercises that forced 
the officers to take positions, think about them, and defend them.92 
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In the new states, as time was found for political training in the units, it 
consisted largely of instruction on how to get along and survive in the chaos of 
democracy and capitalism. Here, former NV A company commanders were at 
a disadvantage, because they knew no more about their new society than their 
soldiers and had the added disadvantage of continually having to defend their 
past service. Even after attending leadership and Innere Fuehrung courses, 
officers and noncommissioned officers had difficulty understanding the prin­
ciples and explaining them to others.93 An after-action report for one of these 
courses stated that the participants only half-heartedly adopted the principles 
and aims of Innere Fuehrung and that their acceptance was based on the 
pragmatic formula: "If it helps me, it's all-right.,,94 In any case, young soldiers 
from old and new states did not like to serve under officers and noncommis­
sioned officers of the old NV A.  
Even if  some soldiers were having trouble grasping the formal lessons on 
Innere Fuehrung, and even before things settled down enough in the units to 
conduct political training, these soldiers were witnessing the principles of 
Innere Fuehrung being lived by the soldiers who came from the old states. The 
very decision to send so few soldiers from the West was based on a desire not 
to insult the dignity and feelings of the officers and men of the old NVA any 
more than was necessary, and this desire was rooted in the central principle of 
Innere Fuehrung. The same was true of the decision of the Commander, 
Bundeswehr Command, East, concerning the uniform. There were enough 
fatigue uniforms to clothe everyone in his command, but not enough dress 
uniforms. Lieutenant General Schoenbohm, with permission of the Minister of 
Defense, ordered that all soldiers in the Bundeswehr East wear fatigues, to 
include himself and his staff officers. From the very beginning, visibly at least, 
there was to be no difference between soldiers of the old NV A and the old 
Bundeswehr; there were to be no second-class soldiers.95 
NV A soldiers were repeatedly surprised by the openness and frankness of 
the Bundeswehr soldiers. For an army who had conducted its business behind 
closed doors and with highly formalized and rigid speech patterns, and whose 
officers were inaccessible to the enlisted men, the informality and accessibility 
of officers like Hans-Peter von Kirchbach and the commander of Bundeswehr 
East himself, Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm, came as a pleasant 
surprise. This kind of working environment was encouraged within the Bun­
deswehr and was repeated often, at many levels. Most Bundeswehr com­
manders welcome questions from subordinates; if they have information, they 
pass it on; if they do not, they say so, and soldiers usually have no fear of asking 
tough questions or requesting assistance. This openness was a key asset for 
Bundeswehr soldiers in dealing with their counterparts from the East.96 
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The openness extended to the public sphere and to people who had been 
enemies of the military during their entire professional lives. Bundeswehr 
commanders opened the installations for visits of civilians, and they visited 
mayors, pastors, priests, school principals, and other prominent citizens of the 
towns in an attempt to establish the sort of contact and support they enjoyed, at 
least to some extent, in the old states. They had public swearing-in ceremonies 
for the new conscripts and recruits and invited their families and the public.  
One local commander worked with his local chamber of commerce to set up 
retraining activities for his soldiers and find them jobs in the civilian economy 
as they left the military.97 
As money began to flow in to upgrade barracks and other facilities, contracts 
went to local finns, providing jobs in the local economies. Although not usually 
considered part of the Bundeswehr's purview, where NVA installations had 
provided services to communities, that agreement continued for the time being. 
This included providing heat to homes from central boilers on the installation, 
running athletic halls and swimming pools, and even stationing units in areas 
where the economy had been dependent on the NY A units previously stationed 
there, whether or not there was an operational need to do 50.98 
This public relations work was generally well received. The swearing-in 
ceremonies were well attended, school children visited open houses hosted by 
the soldiers, and the Catholic church in the new states contracted to provide a 
ministry for soldiers in the installations, which is how the Bundeswehr has 
traditionally managed such care, rather than having a military chaplains' corps. 
The Protestant Church, however, has yet to agree to provide fonnal, pastoral 
support in the installations. Despite repeated attempts by local commanders as 
well as the Commander, Bundeswehr, East to bring the pastors into the military 
community, they have remained at ann's length. This attitude is not difficult to 
understand, since the Protestant clergy were among the leaders of the opposition 
to the GDR throughout its existence. As one pastor told General Schoenbohm, 
"You know, I have spent my entire professional life fighting the state; my family 
had to pay bitterly for this . . .  and now all of a sudden I should work for a state, 
that I don't even know . . .  you must understand, we need time.,,99 This is an 
unfortunate, if understandable, attitude, and one can only hope that the clergy 's 
opinion of the military will change through experience with the Bundeswehr, 
and that this will be the case as well with the rest of the popUlation in the new 
states. loo 
As far as draftees were concerned, little could be done with soldiers con­
scripted in January and May of 1990, but those conscripted by the GDR in 
September were to receive basic training to Bundeswehr standard. It was 
impossible for officers and noncommissioned officers of the old NY A to carry 
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out this training effectively, so the units relied heavily on their sister units in 
the West for teams of trainers, especially noncommissioned officers, to support 
this training. The first soldiers conscripted by the Bundeswehr in the East, called 
up in January 1 99 1 ,  all received their training in the West, thus raising the 
training standard and giving them a chance to meet soldiers in the old states. 
This changed rapidly so that while in the first quarter of 199 1 , 75 percent of the 
soldiers from the new states were trained in the West, by the third quarter the 
number was down to 49 percent and dropping, as training standards rose and 
more equipment became available for training in the East. 101  
By mid- 1 992 a mixed training unit of 2 18 soldiers, 60 percent from the new 
states, 40 percent from the old, was fonned at an old NY A air force installation 
at Dietersdorf in Saxony-Anhalt. The basic and advanced individual training 
provided was considered successful, especially in terms of the ties of com­
radeship built among the young soldiers. \02 Combining Eastern and Western 
soldiers in this one training unit may have been done because of a concern about 
the Bundeswehr in the East's becoming a somewhat separate and second-class 
army in an armed force in which draftees would usually serve near home and 
have no opportunity to meet soldiers from somewhere else. Time will tell 
whether this was no more than just an experiment or is an answer to such a 
problem, but once the leadership personnel and equipment were available to 
the Bundeswehr in the new states, the training standards there rose quickly, and 
the conscript soldiers had experiences comparable to those of the soldiers in the 
West, such as training at the center at Shilo, Canada. 
For the officers of the old NY A, 1 992 was a difficult year. The two-year 
probation period would come to an end, and for those who wished to stay, the 
officer efficiency report they would receive from their commanders, any 
academic reports they received from Bundeswehr schools attended, and finally 
the decision of an independent, citizens' screening board would be key to their 
future careers. Commanders must have had a difficult time making recommen­
dations. The officers were often away from the unit at training courses or in 
training with the sister units in the West; there were often two or three officers 
in one duty position, which made it difficult to know what they could do on 
their own and which also led to a great deal of one-upmanship among the 
officers being rated; and it was impossible to detennine who was really trying 
to come to terms with the new circumstances and what it meant to lead in an 
army in a democracy, and who was merely being opportunistic. Eventually, 
approximately 3 ,000 officers, usually younger, lower-ranking officers, were 
selected for career or long-term (six to twelve years) service. When one 
considers that 32,000 officers had still been serving with the NY A on 3 October 
1990, this action amounted to a purge of the NY A officer corps. 103 That any 
3 1  
The Newport Papers 
officers were accepted, given the problems of downsizing the forces and the 
political baggage these officers brought with them, is a credit to the leadership 
of the Bundeswehr and its belief in the effectiveness of Innere Fuehrung in 
attacking the problematic legacy of the GDR and the NV A. 
Whether this faith is justified may still be an open question. Certainly Innere 
Fuehrung had special strengths which favored its use as a tool in this mission. 
First and foremost it attacked the broken relationship between leader and led in 
the NV A, which reflected broken human relations in the society of the GDR as 
a whole. By treating the soldier as an individual with dignity and rights as well 
as responsibilities, Innere Fuehrung forced officers and noncommissioned 
officers to try to understand and empathize with their troops. That difficulty in 
dealing with people, along with an understandable problem of grasping the 
soldier's responsibilities vis-a-vis a democratic state, were the two biggest 
hurdles the remnant of the NV A in the Bundeswehr had to overcome, and the 
concepts of Innere Fuehrung dealt specifically with them. 104 
Coming to grips with the principles of Innere Fuehrung also forced those 
who remained to confront their past and their role in supporting the SED regime. 
In doing this, they did not always receive the support they should have expected 
from the soldiers of the old Bundeswehr, many of whom were very judgmental 
of their Eastern counterparts and boorish in dealing with them. But the overall 
extent of the Westerners' openness and willingness to work together usually 
became evident to the more perceptive officers of the old NV A when they 
considered what they would have done had history taken a different turn and 
the NV A had taken over the Bundeswehr105 
Innere Fuehrung's greatest strength may well be that it has become a central 
tenet of the Bundeswehr's world view and permeates so many aspects of its 
training and activities. Thus, if the classes were boring or not understood, one 
could still come to an understanding-through the actions of soldiers of the old 
Bundeswehr-of what it meant to serve in an army in a democracy. There were 
many examples of mere time-serving and arrogance among the officers and 
noncommissioned officers of the Bundeswehr who served in the new states, 
and this was certainly true when more than just volunteers were required, but 
by and large the principles of Innere Fuehrung were probably taught more 
effectively by example than through classroom instruction. 
The Bundeswehr still faces problems in the new states, some that concern 
the tenets of Innere Fuehrung and some that threaten the very acceptance of 
these tenets by soldiers in the East, whether they are from the old NV A or are 
new conscripts or recruits. From its very inception in the 1950s, a central tenet 
of Innere Fuehrung has been that the only acceptable traditions for the Bun­
deswehr are those that support the ideals of an army in a democracy and that 
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even soldierly virtues of bravery and loyalty have little meaning separate from 
the aims for which soldiers fight. Thus, in his letter of instruction of 24 
September 1990 concerning the establishment of unified Gennan anned forces, 
the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr wrote that as the NV A had been, until 9 
November 1 989, an "Anny of the Party and instrument of a dictatorship," it 
would cease to exist and . . .  "Symbols, unifonns, and traditions of the NV A 
will not be transferred" to the Bundeswehr. 106 
The problem, as the Bundeswehr found in relation to the Reichswehr and 
Wehnnacht, is that traditions do not die that easily; many who served in the 
NV A, whether they are still in the Bundeswehr or are now in the civilian world, 
feel that they served honorably in defense of their land and had certain virtues 
which it would behoove the Bundeswehr to acknowledge. They have disdain 
for what they perceive to be the Bundeswehr's nine-to-five attitude toward duty, 
and indeed, during the logistical support for the U.S. deployment to Saudi 
Arabia, young fonner NV A officers often demonstrated greater willingness to 
endure long hours and hardship than did some officers of the old Bundes­
wehr. 107 This sort of professionalism may be a quality that an anny like the 
Bundeswehr, which has been criticized for being too "occupational" in its 
outlook and too closely tied to civilian society, should not dismiss out of hand. 
Perhaps the right attitude here is General von Kirchbach's view that while 
the NV A's forty-year existence does not constitute tradition, it is part of Gennan 
history and should not be ignored. Indeed, as the experience of the GDR proved, 
to ignore portions of history merely because they are uncomfortable or do not 
fit into a preconceived story is very dangerous. As von Kirchbach notes, the 
NV A was a very professional and competent anny, at least in some areas, with 
experience in assistance to the civilian sector that included industrial production 
in the last years of the GDR, and these facts should be recognized as positive 
achievements in Gennan military history . 108 
In recognizing these positive aspects, however, the Bundeswehr must steer 
clear of encouraging a tendency for NV A veterans to deny complicity in the 
SED regime. Some of them are attempting to rationalize their previous actions 
in the light of infonnation now available to them. Thus, after an initial shock 
that their high readiness rate seemed to be for nothing,  some veterans are now 
arguing that since the NV A was essentially a defensive anny, it had to remain 
constantly on guard against a Bundeswehr which could afford to take weekends 
and holidays off because, as the aggressor, it could pick the time and place of 
its attack. 1OO This sort of argument and other myths, including those concerning 
the reasons for the NV A' s lack of action during the Turning Point, must be met 
with the hard truth both within the anned forces and in the public. This complex 
of problems, however, falls well within the competencies Innere Fuehrung has 
33 
The Newport Papers 
encouraged in the anned forces, and questions of denial and tradition have been 
previously dealt with in the Bundeswehr's short history. More intractable, 
because not amenable to solution by the military alone, is the problem of 
second-class citizenship and the reSUlting danger of an anny within an anny. 
Second-class citizenship, the feeling that one is being treated shabbily in 
one 's own country, has been prevalent throughout the new states. Once the 
euphoria induced by unification wore off, East Gennans began to feel they were 
being annexed by the West and that their worth as people was being attacked. 
High unemployment rates and the failure of Bonn to deliver on what had seemed 
to be a promise of instant prosperity, along with the arrogance and lack of 
empathy of many West Gennans, including members of the Bundeswehr, have 
caused some East Gennans to overlook the progress that is being made and to 
long for a security lost with the fall of the GDR. Within the Bundeswehr, these 
feelings were aggravated by a differential in pay between Bundeswehr East and 
West, and by what was perceived to be a poor pension plan for NVA retirees. 
The pay for conscripts became unifonn in July 199 1 and is becoming equitable 
for the officers and noncommissioned officers. However, pay , poor facilities, 
and career uncertainties led to many complaints to the parliamentary om­
budsman, l lO and continued perceived inequities could play into the hands of 
NV A veterans who have their own agendas. 
Many of these veterans are members of the Bundeswehr professional as­
sociation, the Association of the Gennan Anned Forces (Verband der 
Deutschen Bundeswehr), based on their short service as Bundeswehr soldiers 
in the months following unification. NV A officers who have left the service are 
still living in housing areas with active-duty fonner NV A officers, because there 
is nowhere else for them to go. Retired senior NV A officers are still in contact 
with their past subordinates, and very senior officers (i.e. , generals and ad­
mirals) are essentially unreconstructed in their attitudes. I I I  Although powerless 
now and probably more interested in pay and pension issues than anything else, 
they could still become a force to be reckoned with should the Bundeswehr in 
the new states become ingrown and provincial. 
In his present position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army ,  
Brigadier General von Kirchbach does not believe this will happen to the new 
states. In April 1993, the first two hundred officers from the new states were 
transferred to duty in the old states, and nonnal rotations between old and new 
states will prevent the Bundeswehr in the East from becoming an anny within 
an anny. Newly commissioned officers from the new states attended basic 
courses in the West in 1993, as well, and in 1994 Eastern officers began 
attending staff officer courses. I l2 There are still problems with housing for 
officers going in both directions: in the West housing is difficult to fmd and it 
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is expensive; in the East it is substandard or non-existent. The problem, 
however, may not be with the officers but with the noncommissioned officers 
who do not move very much from duty station to duty station in the Bundes­
wehr, and the conscripts, who generally serve close to home. The distinct 
possibility that the Bundeswehr may become a volunteer army in the near future 
could obviate the problem, if volunteers are forced to move, it could, however, 
make the problem worse if the present policy of seldom moving noncommis­
sioned officers and soldiers continues, because as volunteers, soldiers will be 
serving longer terms than would conscripts and might not move at all during 
their enlistments. 1 1 3  
Innere Fuehrung does not directly address economic difficulties and feelings 
of second-class citizenship, or the danger that part of a nation, and thus part of 
its armed forces, could become a backwater ripe for reactionary propaganda. 
In fact, Baudissin pointed out under similar circumstances in 1956 that soldiers 
who have problems with pay, facilities, and benefits are going to have difficulty 
dealing with the higher concepts of Innere Fuehrung. 1 14 The Bundeswehr 
leadership, however, found imaginative solutions to at least some of these 
problems. Soldiers from the new states who were sent on the United Nations 
mission to Cambodia, for example, were brought to the old states en route to 
Cambodia, making them eligible for comparable pay because soldiers from the 
East, when stationed in the old states, receive the same pay as their Western 
counterparts. There is some evidence of a sort of unofficial affirmative action 
program for soldiers from the new states, and if anything, these soldiers may 
be given the benefit of the doubt to ensure success in their new careers. l I S  That 
the building of the Bundeswehr in the new states is regarded as a great peacetime 
challenge, and that it will be career-enhancing for a Western officer who 
serves1 16 in the East, should continue to attract officers of high quality from the 



















New Missions for Innere Fuehrung 
T
HE PROBLEMS JUST OUTLINED pale in comparison to the civil-military 
challenges in countries to the east of Gennany. The countries of the 
Warsaw Pact, including those in Central and Eastern Europe and of the old 
Soviet Union, have all approached the Bundeswehr for infonnation about 
civil-military relations in a democracy . Over two hundred officers from the old 
Warsaw Pact countries have already attended courses at the Center for Innere 
Fuehrung in Koblenz, and the Center has a two-year memoranda of agreement 
with the defense establishments of these countries to provide a variety of 
courses, seminars, and familiarization visits on the theme of "The Soldier and 
the Anned Forces in and for Democracy." These countries have approached 
the Bundeswehr because of its proximity and, in the case of countries like 
Hungary, historical ties. The Bundeswehr is also a conscript anny like theirs 
and has had immediate experience in dealing with a socialist anny, the NV A, 
with similar organization, ethos, and problems. 
Yet another reason given for interest in the Bundeswehr and Innere Fueh­
rung is the belief that the Bundeswehr is an example, perhaps the only example, 
of an anny successfully growing out of totalitarianism and into the service of 
a democratic society. This is not true, however, because as we have seen, the 
Bundeswehr came into existence a decade after the fall of the Third Reich, and 
even so, its birth as an anny in a democracy was difficult enough. Whether the 
anned forces of the old Warsaw Pact can make the transition, especially facing 
problems such as the breakup of their countries and the need for soldiers to 
decide which state they will serve, is yet to be seen. I I? Given the failure of the 
NV A to refonn itself with its old leadership still in place, the prospects are 
doubtful. Perhaps the best one can hope for is that the need to reduce radically 
their militaries for budgetary reasons will act to some extent as a purge of the 
did guard in these countries. 
The United States is also assisting in the endeavor to establish proper 
civil-military relations in these countries, and an understanding of Innere 
Fuehrung in addition to our own traditions of civilian supremacy could only 
enhance these efforts. Moreover, the anned forces of the United States should 
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not be so smug as to believe they have nothing to learn in this area. A recent 
award-winning article in Parameters indicated that perhaps in light of the armed 
forces' changing relationship to civilian authority and growing isolation from 
the mainstream of American society, greater emphasis should be placed on the 
sort of training Innere Fuehrung has always stressed in the Bundeswehr. 1 1 8 
The principles of Innere Fuehrung were born in a difficult time, proved 
themselves in the old Bundeswehr against hard challenges in every decade 
leading to unification, and, if not the complete answer to the needs of the 
Bundeswehr in the new states, they have certainly provided a compass for the 
first soldiers who went East after 2 October 1 990. It has also been a basis upon 
which soldiers from the new states, whether former NV A or new recruits, can 
build their understanding of the meaning of their service and their relation to 
their society. Besides the challenges it now faces in the new states, the 
Bundeswehr and its guiding principles are confronted by major new challenges. 
With the waning of the Cold War and the inception of a dangerous and 
unknown new world, the Bundeswehr faces the challenge of preparing itself 
for missions outside the traditional framework of NATO. Whether the principles 
of Innere Fuehrung can be translated to cover the exigencies of out-of-sector 
missions may be open to debate, but the underlying principle that the soldier is 
a thinking individual who must understand the "why" even more than the "how" 
of what is asked of him is leading to discussion within the Bundeswehr, as well 
as the public, of what should in fact be asked of him. In the public this is being 
reflected in a record number of conscientious objectors, which peaked during 
the Gulf War. This negative response among young Germans called into 
question the basis for the Bundeswehr's personnel planning, even before it 
became evident that the armed forces will sink well below the ceiling of 370,000 
troops agreed upon between Chancellor Kohl and Premier Gorbachev, raising 
the spectre of a volunteer force. 1 19 
If the Bundeswehr does become a volunteer army, the concepts of Innere 
Fuehrung will more than ever have to tie the soldier to his society, because the 
link of universal military service, which bound the soldier and civil society 
together, will have been broken. The idea of universal service, dating back to 
the Prussian reformers of the Wars of Liberation, according to which all 
able-bodied male citizens served their nation through a term in the military, has 
become more of a myth in recent years, as fewer soldiers have been needed to 
fill the ranks, but it remains an important myth in a society seeking to avoid the 
creation of a military caste. Whether soldiers are recruited or conscripted, if the 
leadership of the Bundeswehr is to retain the fragile support of the German 
people, it will have to explain clearly and compellingly the need for a military 











its borders. If the Bundeswehr can meet these challenges, it will in no small part 
be due to the concepts of an army in a democracy enunciated in the principles 
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108. Von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt. pp. 1 69-70. In his book. von Kirchbach goes 
on to say that traditions of Bundeswehr units disbanded in the old states should not be 
transferred to units in the new states. and that his own 4 1 st Home Defense Brigade should 
remember that it was fonned out of the 9th NV A Annored Division, not out of love of 
tradition but because it is history. In discussion he mentioned that he had kept equipment 
from the 9th Division on hand, ignoring directives to turn it in, with the objective of 
eventually establishing a unit museum. On the subject of NV A assistance in civilian 
production, it should be noted that as the GDR's economy collapsed, more and more soldiers 
were diverted from military duties to service in factories and mines, often doing work in 
conditions too dangerous for civilian workers, until 55,000 soldiers were working in the 
civilian economy. The units still had to remain at 85 percent readiness despite this loss of 
manpower. 
1 09. Discussion with Colonel Francke. 
1 1 0. Holger Arnold, " Zu neh mend sozialer Zu ends toJ! in der Truppe, " Neu e  Zeit, 
1 8 September 1 992. 
1 1 1 .  Discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Frei , Lieutenant Colonel lckenroth, and Mr. 
Knabe. In connection with his doctoral work at the University of Leipzig, Mr. Knabe 
interviewed fifteen former-NV A generals and admirals. According to his findings the majority 
of them had not changed their views and felt that socialism had only been incorrectly 
implemented. Some of them also told him that they had considered a putsch at the time of 
the Turning Point but had decided not to carry it out after the Soviet Forces in Germany 
told them they would not support it and because they had no idea what they would do if 
they took power. Concerning membership of fonner-NV A officers in the "Verband 
Deutscher Bundeswehr," I found divided opinions among Bundeswehr officers. Some felt 
that since they had served, even if only two or three months, they had a right to be there. 
Others felt that membership gave them an air of respectability which they did not deserve. 
1 1 2. Discussion with Brigadier Ge neral von Kirchbach. 
1 1 3.  For discussion of the possibility of a volunteer Bundeswehr, see " Wehrpj1icht am 
Ende?" Der Spiegel, vol. 47 ,  issue 6, 8 February 1 993, pp. 36 ff. 
1 1 4. Abenheim. Reforging the Iron Cross, pp. 1 7 1-2. 
1 1 5 .  Discussion with Colonel Bernd Mueller, Anny Attache, German Embassy, 
Washington D.C. ,  1 8 December 1 992. In both his book and in discussion. Brigadier General 
von Kirchbach makes no secret of the fact that he is a "booster" of the soldiers from the new 
states, and takes every opportunity to present them in a favorable light. That he also 
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understands the ongoing difficulties, which Innere Fuehrung must address, is evident in a speech 
to the officers of the 41st Home Defense Brigade reprinted as "Offizier im Heer der Einheit," 
Truppenpraxis, no.  4, July-August, 1 992. 
1 16. Discussion with Colonel Rieck. 
1 1 7 .  Discussion with Colonel Francke. 
1 1 8. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. , "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 201 2," 
Parametm, vol. 22, no. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 1 0-1 1 ,  15.  
1 1 9. "Gewehr unterm Baum, " Der Spiegel, vol. 47,  issue 2, 1 1 January 1993, pp.  34 ff. 
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